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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner, IHC Affiliated Services, (the employer), 
appeals a final Order of the Industrial Commission which upheld, 
and adopted as its own, the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge in favor of Respondent Lawrence Schmidt, (the employee). The 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to §35-1-
82.53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §63-46b-16, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 14 Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1; Whether the Industrial Commission overturned or 
sustained the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of an order presents 
a legal issue which is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983); Traylor Bros. 
Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
ISSUE 2: Whether the "legal causation" test of Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), was met. 
Standard of Review: The findings of the Industrial 
Commission and Administrative Law Judge will be affirmed if they 
are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
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whole record before the court. §63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended; Grace Drilling v. Board of Reviews, 
776 P. 2d 63 (Utah App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989). 
ISSUE 3: Whether the "medical causation" test of Allen 
v. Industrial Commission, supra, was met. 
Standard of Review: The findings of the Industrial 
Commission and Administrative Law Judge will be affirmed if they 
are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court. §63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended; Grace Drilling v Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989). 
ISSUE 4: Whether the admission of evidence on the 
employee's travel schedule and travel fatigue which immediately 
preceded the occurrence of his injury was improper. 
Standard of Review: The admission of evidence of the 
type in question is a discretionary function of the judge which is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hester v. South 
Ocrden City, 660 P.2d 243 (Utah 1983); 
ISSUE 5: Whether the post-Hearing evidence was admitted 
and, if so, whether its admission prejudiced the outcome of the 
case. 
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Standard of Review: The determination of whether the 
post-Hearing evidence was admitted is a question of law which is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Utah Dept of Admin. 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 
1983); Traylor Bros. Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton. 735 P.2d 1048, 
1050 (Utah App. 1987). The determination of whether its admission, 
if any, unduly prejudiced the outcome is reviewed under the abuse 
of discretion and harmless error standards. Hester v. South Ocrden 
City, 660 P.2d 243 (Utah 1983); Worker's Comp. Fund v. Industrial 
Commission, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah App. 1988); Olsen v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Respondent Lawrence Schmidt submits that the 
interpretation of §35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
is determinative of this case. Said statute reads as follows: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 3 5-1-
4 3 who is injured and the dependents of each 
such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if 
the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such 
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided 
in this chapter. The responsibility for 
compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter 
shall be on the employer and its insurance 
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carrier and not on the employee. 
The pivotal portions of the foregoing statute have been 
interpreted in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986). Plaintiff submits that no questions of constitutional 
import arise in connection with this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Worker's Compensation case in which Respondent, 
Lawrence Schmidt (employee) claims entitlement to compensation 
benefits as a result of a back injury which he sustained while 
engaged in work-related activities for his employer, IHC Affiliated 
Services. 
At the Worker's Compensation Hearing, Mr. Schmidt 
presented evidence relating to the background and circumstances 
leading up to the actual lifting event which produced injury. He 
also produced medical evidence on the cause of his injury. Mr. 
Schmidt admitted that he had a pre-existing back injury. 
The Administrative Law Judge who conducted the Hearing 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that held Mr. 
Schmidt to be entitled to compensation benefits from both the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund and his self-insured employer, IHC 
Affiliated Services. The Employer's Reinsurance Fund did not 
appeal the decision and has since paid the amounts it was required 
to pay. The employer asked the Industrial Commission to Review the 
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Order of the Judge. 
The Industrial Commission sustained the Findings and 
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge, (a fact disputed by IHC) , 
and adopted them as its own. The employer (IHC) appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to the time of his employment with IHC Affiliated 
Services, Lawrence Schmidt had sustained a back injury which had 
produced a ten percent impairment of his person. (R. 333.) This 
pre-existing injury impairment rating was established by Dr. Joseph 
Charles Rich, Neurosurgeon, and was undisputed by the employer. (R. 
333,34.) 
Lawrence Schmidt began working for IHC Affiliated 
Services in late February, 1988. (R. 38.) In his position as 
Product Information Manager, he was required to demonstrate 
computer software applications for hospitals throughout the United 
States. (R. 36,39.) His travel schedule and presentation 
requirements were controlled by his employer. (R. 38-39.) His 
demonstrations were conducted from a standing position. (R. 49-50.) 
From February 1988 through the time of his injury on May 
6, 1988, Mr. Schmidt was on the road an average of three to four 
days per week. (R. at 38.) Sometimes his schedule was so demanding 
that he would leave his home on Sunday and not return until Friday. 
(R. 38.) While on the road he worked 10-20 hours per day. (R. 57.) 
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As part of his job Mr. Schmidt typically carried three 
bags with him when he traveled: (1) A computer case weighing 
approximately 18 pounds, containing a computer, power cord, P.C. 
viewer, phone line, cable, multiple outlet switch, transformer and 
batteries; (2) A personal bag weighing approximately ten pounds, 
containing a calendar, agendas, maps, books and papers; and (3) A 
garment bag weighing approximately 25 pounds, containing extra 
suits, underclothing, shoes, toiletries, etc. (R. 20,37,69,70.) 
Mr. Schmidt frequently traveled with others. Their 
practice was to not check any baggage. (R. 42.) In order to 
comply with the airline requirements restricting carry-on baggage 
to two parcels, Mr. Schmidt would consolidate his computer bag and 
his personal bag into one 28 pound package for carrying. (R. 42.) 
The 25 pound garment bag constituted his second parcel. 
During the week of his injury on May 6, 1988, Mr. 
Schmidt's travel schedule was particularly demanding. He left Sailt 
Lake City at 12:30 p.m. to fly through Dallas-Fort Worth where he 
connected with another flight to Baltimore. Arrival in Baltimore 
was at 8:30 p.m. (R. 46.) In Salt Lake City he carried his 53 
pounds of baggage from his car to the airport, through the airport 
and onto the plane, where he stowed it. He then unloaded it in 
Dallas, carried it through the airport to his connecting flight and 
loaded it again. He repeated the unloading and loading processes 
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in Baltimore, carried the baggage to a rental car, travelled to a 
hotel and carried the baggage to his hotel room. (R. 47.) The 
next morning, February 3, he arose early so as to be at a hospital 
to conduct a demonstration by 7:30 a.m.. (R. 47.) He carried all 
baggage to the car, travelled to the hospital, unloaded his bags 
and conducted the demonstration, which lasted until afternoon. 
Upon completion of the demonstration, he repacked the equipment, 
loaded it into the car and repeated the loading, unloading and 
carrying processes again in traveling by commuter airline to White 
Plains, New York. (R. 48) 
Mr. Schmidt arrived in White Plains, New York at 6:45 
p.m.. He checked into the hotel by 8:00 or 8:30 p.m.. The next 
day, February 4, he arose at 6:00 a.m. and left by 7:00 a.m. in a 
rental car to make hospital demonstrations which continued through 
Thursday, February 5. (R. 49, 53.) The demonstration went overtime 
and Mr. Schmidt had to reschedule his flight to his next 
destination, Oklahoma City. (R. 49.) He left White Plains, New 
York in a hurry, loaded his baggage and drove to the JFK Airport 
(approximately one and one-half hours away) where he caught a 
flight to Dallas and then to Oklahoma City. (R. 49.) He arrived 
in Oklahoma City at approximately 11:00 p.m. (R. 50.) Again he 
carried all his bags to and from a rental car counter, loaded the 
car, drove to the hotel, unloaded the car and carried the bags to 
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his room. (R. 50.) He never hired porters or paid bell captains 
because of lack of funds to do so. (R. 48.) The hotel was 
approximately 45 minutes from the airport. (R. 51.) By the time 
he arrived and got to bed, it was after 2:00 a.m. on Friday, May 6. 
(R. 53.) 
After a few hours of sleep, Mr. Schmidt arose and 
traveled to a hospital with his equipment and baggage where he 
conducted another demonstration for approximately three-fourths of 
the day. (R. 51.) He was scheduled to return to Salt Lake City on 
a mid-afternoon flight but the demonstration went overtime and he 
had to reschedule. (R. 51.) After the demonstration was 
completed, Mr. Schmidt again packed up his equipment and carried it 
back to the car and the airport where he waited for his flight to 
take him back home. (R. 51.) While waiting, he filled out forms 
required by his employer. (R. 52.) 
Mr. Schmidt testified that, as he sat in the airport, he 
"was tired . . . very tired." (R. 53-54.) He had had an awkward 
time carrying his baggage and moving through the airport. (R. 54.) 
It was hard to balance the bags on his shoulders, put them through 
x-ray machines, and carry them about. (R. 54.) The computer 
generated additional security questions and Mr. Schmidt was 
required to do a lot of repeated picking up and putting down of his 
bags. (R. 54.) 
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As Mr. Schmidt sat at the airport, filing out forms, he 
became irritated at the tobacco smoke which was being produced by 
the crowd of people which had begun to congregate around him. (R. 
52.) He decided to move. (Id.) He reached down to again pick up 
his bags. He reached for the bag containing his personal effects 
and the computer equipment and jerked it to his shoulder. (R. 
52,73,81.) The bag being lifted weighed approximately 28 pounds. 
(R. 73-74.) As he jerked the bag to his shoulder, he felt a sudden 
pull on his back which produced pain that intensified as the night 
progressed. (R. 74-75,77,82.) Prior to the jerking of the bag, 
Mr. Schmidt had not experienced any back pain. (R. 74.) He had 
not seen any doctors about any symptoms relating to back pain since 
1986, a period of approximately two years. (R. 78-79.) 
When Mr. Schmidt returned to Salt Lake City, his back was 
stiff and uncomfortable. (R. 54.) On Saturday and Sunday his back 
pain became progressively worse. (R. 55.) On Monday, May 9th, Mr. 
Schmidt returned to work and reported the injury to his supervisor. 
(R. 1, 56.) Two days later, on May 11, 1988, after continued 
worsening of the pain in his back, Mr. Schmidt went to the 
Cottonwood Hospital Emergency Room. (R. 199.) Thereafter he was 
treated by several doctors, culminating in the performance of back 
surgery upon him by Dr. Joseph Charles Rich on July 29, 1988. (R. 
207-208, 284-296, 224-225.) 
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Mr. Schmidt's claim for Worker's Compensation Benefits 
was denied by his employer. (R. 2.) He, therefore, filed an 
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission in which he 
stated that his injuries occurred while he was involved in business 
travel for his employer. (R. 9.) 
The Hearing on Mr. Schmidt's application was held on June 
9, 1989. During the hearing, Exhibit A-l, which containeu a. 
medical report from Dr. Joseph Charles Rich, dated May 18, 1989, 
was offered into evidence and received without objection. (R. 96, 
156-57, 23.) In the letter, Dr. Rich says that he found Mr. 
Schmidt to have a right L-4/5 disc herniation which he said was 
caused by the lifting episode in the airport on May 6, 1988. (R. 
156.) His opinion was expressed to a reasonable medical 
probability. (R. 156.) He also expressed his opin .on that Mr. 
Schmidt had a twenty percent permanent partial disability, ten 
percent of which was pre-existing and ten percent of which was from 
the lifting episode. (R. 157.) He further stated that Mr. 
Schmidt's traveling and lifting were enough to produce an 
environment in which injuries can occur. (Id.) 
In an effort to narrow the issues before him at the 
Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge asked the attorney for the 
employer whether there was evidence to establish "medical 
causation." (R. 27.) The attorney replied that Dr. Rich's report 
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did that. (Id.) The attorney then stated that the basic defense 
was "legal causation." (Id.) At a later point in the Hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge commented that it appeared that the 
primary issue in the case was one of legal causation. (R. 30.) 
The attorney for the employer agreed that such was his belief. 
(Id.) After further discussion with counsel, the Administrative 
Law Judge stated that the major issue was whether the "legal 
causation" requirements had been met, whereupon he ruled that he 
would only receive testimony relating to that issue. (R. 34.) 
Following the Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge 
issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law holding that Mr. 
Schmidt's travel and work activities were unusual or extraordinary 
and were, therefore, sufficient to meet the "legal causation" 
requirements, thereby permitting him to recover Worker's 
Compensation Benefits. (R. 305.) The Judge ordered the employer 
to pay such portions of the award as related to the new injury and 
ordered the Employer's Reinsurance Fund to pay for aggravated pre-
existing injury. (R. 306.) 
Although the employer appealed the decision to the 
Industrial Commission, the Employer's Reinsurance Fund did not 
appeal. The Reinsurance Fund has made payments to Mr. Schmidt as 
ordered. 
On March 29, 1990, the Industrial Commission entered its 
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order denying the employer's appeal and specifically adopting the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings as its own. (R. 11-12.) The 
exact wording of its Order was "IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the 
Applicant's Motion for Review is hereby denied and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge is sustained." (R. 12.) 
The employer appeals the Industrial Commission Order to 
this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner (the employer) argues erroneously that the 
Industrial Commission altered the Decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge. Such is not the case. The Decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge was adopted in full, although the 
Commission seemed to point out, by way of explanation, that it 
would have applied a lesser standard which Mr. Schmidt could have 
met without the need to show legal causation. 
When one examines all of the circumstances leading up to 
the event which actually produced injury to Mr. Schmidt, it can be 
seen that the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission did not err in concluding that Mr. Schmidt had been 
subjected to unusual and extraordinary exertion which had set the 
stage for his injury. 
Medical causation was not an issue before the 
Administrative Law Judge, it having been conceded by the employer 
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before the Hearing began. However, even if it had been an issue, 
the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission was sufficient to support the holding in the employee's 
favor. 
An employer who schedules the work week for and levies 
unusually demanding work requirements upon his employees cannot 
complain of surprise that the employee relies upon such events as 
being contributing factors to his injury. Such factors are part 
and parcel of the events producing injury. 
There is no indication that the Industrial Commission 
received or considered post-Hearing evidence in making its 
decision. Even if such an action had been taken, however, and had 
been erroneous, such an error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Worker's Compensation Act Should Be 
Liberally Construed In Favor Of Coverage Of 
The Employee. 
It has been the policy of the Courts that the Worker's 
Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of coverage 
of the employee. (See North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 58 U. 486, 200 P. Ill (1921) ; Jones v. California 
Packing Corp. , 121 U. 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); and Askren v. 
Industrial Commission, 15 U.2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964). This 
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over-arching principle, designed to reduce the amount of expense 
and delay associated with resolving coverage disputes, has 
application in the present case. Mr. Schmidt, the respondent, 
submits that he has shown that he is entitled to the benefits 
awarded by the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission and that their decisions should be upheld. 
Point II 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act Does Not Apply To 
Determinations Of An Employee's Eligibility For Benefits Under 
The Worker's Compensation Act; However. There Was Compliance 
With UAPA's Requirements In Any Event. 
Major portions of the employer's Brief are devoted to 
contentions that the Industrial Commission failed to abide by the 
requirements of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Mr. 
Schmidt maintains that the UAPA does not apply to the Order of the 
Industrial Commission, but that, even if it did, all of its 
requirements were met. 
The scope and applicability of the Administrative 
Procedures Act are established by statute: 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection 
(2), and except as otherwise provided by a 
statute superseding provisions of this chapter 
by explicit reference to this chapter, the 
provisions of this chapter apply to every 
agency of the State of Utah and govern: 
* * * 
(2) The provisions of this chapter do 
not govern 
* * * 
(i) . . . the initial determination 
14 
of anv person's eligibility for benefits under 
Chapters 1 and 2. Title 35 . . . . 
(§63-46b-l, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Emphasis 
added.) 
The Worker's Compensation scheme in Utah is contained in 
Chapter 1, Title 35, Utah Code Annotated. Under that system it is 
the Industrial Commission that is charged with the responsibility 
to make determinations of a person's eligibility for benefits. 
(See §35-1-1, 35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-1-46, and 35-1-82.52, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended.) The Commission appoints 
Administrative Law Judges and, either the Commission or the Judges 
may preside at Hearings held to adjudicate disputes over the 
awarding of benefits. (§35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as 
amended.) The Commission may or may not follow the recommendations 
of the Administrative Law Judges since it is specifically empowered 
by the Legislature to make its investigation, 
in such manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights 
of the parties and to carry out the spirit of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
(§35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.) 
The decision of an Administrative Law Judge is subject to 
review by the Industrial Commission. commission Orders are final 
unless overturned by the Court of Appeals, §35-1-82.53, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The foregoing makes it clear that the initial 
15 
determination of a person's eligibility for Worker's Compensation 
Benefits is not completed until the Industrial Commission rules. 
Thus, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not begin to 
apply until the time that the Industrial Commission decision is 
placed for review before the Utah Court of Appeals. In the present 
case, the employer's arguments that the Administrative Procedures 
Act was not followed by the Industrial Commission, are not well 
taken. 
Even if the Utah Administrative Procedures Act were 
deemed to govern the actions of the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Industrial Commission in the Worker's Compensation setting, it 
is Mr. Schmidt's position that there was compliance. The Order of 
the Industrial Commission denying IHC's Motion for Review contains 
a designation of the statute permitting its review of the ALJ's 
decision. It also states the issues reviewed, adopts findings and 
conclusions, specifically affirms the Administrative Law Judge and 
states the reasons for its disposition. Such an Order is in 
compliance with §63-46b-12(6)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. (The Utah Administrative Procedures Act.) 
Although its Order is not a model of clarity, the 
Commission specifically addresses the issues of whether the Allen 
tests were met and whether they needed to be met. In dicta, the 
Commission states its view that the Administrative Law Judge need 
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not have applied the Allen test. However, notwithstanding its own 
opinion about what could have been done, the Commission, in 
unmistakable language, adopted the Administrative Law Judge's 
Decision (including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) as its 
own: 
The Commission believes that the 
Administrative Law Judge did not abuse his 
discretion and should therefore be sustained. 
The Commission, adopts the Administrative Law 
Judge's findings as its own. 
* * * 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the 
Applicant's Motion for Review is hereby denied 
and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge 
is sustained. 
(R. 366.) 
Since the Administrative Law Judge's Decision was adopted 
in its entirety, there can be no legitimate argument that the 
Industrial Commission failed to give proper deference to the 
Judge's position. 
In Olsen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937 
(Utah App. 1989), the Industrial Commission's decision contained 
statements which were incorrect and inappropriate. Those 
statements were dicta and were held by the Court to be harmless 
where they did not appear to have affected the Commission's 
decision. (Id. at 940, n.2.) A similar situation presents itself 
in the present case. Although the Commission has included arguably 
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incorrect views about Mr. Schmidt's pre-existing condition in its 
Order, those views are inconsequential and harmless due to the fact 
that its ultimate decision was to adopt the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
POINT III 
The Circumstances Of This Case Show That Mr. Schmidt's 
Employment Contributed Something Substantial To 
Increase The Risk That He Already Faced In Everyday 
Life Because Of His Pre-Existincr Condition; 
Therefore, Legal Causation Was Shown. 
Since the present case arose after the effective date of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the standard of review to 
be applied appears to require that there be substantial evidence in 
the whole record before the Court to support the Industrial 
Commission determination if it is to be upheld. (See §63-46b-
16(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; and Zimmerman v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989).) 
Mr. Schmidt submits that an examination of the entire record shows 
that the Industrial Commission's Decision should be upheld. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a worker had a pre-
existing condition, he could not recover damages for on-the-job 
aggravation of that condition unless there was some circumstance or 
exertion required by the employment which increased the risk of 
injury which the worker normally faced in his everyday life. (Id. 
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at 25) The Court said: 
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or 
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable . . . ." 
[Citations omitted.] To meet the legal 
causation requirement, a claimant with a pre-
existing condition must show that the 
employment contributed something substantial 
to increase the risk he already faced in 
everyday life because of his condition. This 
additional element of risk in the work place 
is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. 
(Id. at 25. Emphasis added. Note: The Allen case interprets the 
requirements of §35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.) 
It is important to note that unusual exertion is one way 
to show an increased risk of injury. It may even be the usual way. 
But it is not only way. What is required is that the claimant show 
that the conditions of his employment were not just typical of 
everyday life but were usual in a way that subjected him to 
stresses that were greater than those experienced in the non-
employment life of the average person. (Id. at 26; see also Sisco 
Hilte v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 766 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Utah 
App. 1988).) 
The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law recount the grueling nature of Mr. Schmidt's 
travel schedule in the days preceding his injury. The transcript 
of the Hearing contains ample support for those Findings. Mr. 
Schmidt was required by his employers to leave his home on Monday 
and travel by air and ground in a span of only five days from Salt 
Lake City, to Dallas, to Baltimore, to White Plains, New York, to 
JFK International Airport, to Oklahoma City and back to Salt Lake 
City. He made stops in each place, where he was required to lift 
and carry fifty-three pounds of baggage repeatedly loading and 
unloading it into rental cars, airport metal detectors, hotel 
rooms, elevators, overhead storage compartments, etc. He set up 
and took down equipment for demonstrations in multiple different 
cities. He stood on his feet all day, worked ten to twenty hours 
each day, sometimes got only a few hours of sleep, and then rushed 
to catch a plane where he was confined in an airline seat until 
arriving at his next destination. The night before his injury, he 
did not get to bed until 2:00 a.m. only to find himself with a need 
to awaken early so that he could spend three-fourths of the day on 
his feet in another demonstration. He was fatigued and spent. 
Such a regimen is not something ordinarily nor typically 
faced by a modern day worker as part of his everyday life. The 
travel demands, especially with respect to lifting, carrying and 
transporting substantial amounts of baggage, were indeed 
"substantial" under the requirements of the Allen case. The 
lifting and pulling, tugging and toting, and nearly 24 hour per day 
demands of an extraordinarily vigorous travel schedule over a five 
day period, certainly increased the risk faced by Mr. Schmidt that 
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his pre-existing back injury would become aggravated. 
Mr. Schmidt's employer argues that the simple lifting of 
twenty-eight pounds of baggage is not unusual exertion. Mr. 
Schmidt agrees. If that is all that he had done to become injured, 
he would not have made a claim. However, as the evidence shows, 
Mr. Schmidt did much more than simply lift twenty-eight pounds of 
baggage. In Smith & Edwards v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 77C 
I 
P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989), the Court noted its past rejection of 
the idea that there was some sort of weight test that qualified fqr 
I 
unusual exertion. It said that an examination of the facts aiid 
circumstances of the employment activity was required before a 
determination could be made about whether the activity was usual or 
unusual. (See Id. at 1018.) Mr. Schmidt submits that the 
Administrative Law Judge's holding (which was adopted by the 
Industrial Commission), that his injury occurred in connection with 
work-related duties that were "unusual or extraordinary" was 
correct and that legal causation under the Allen case was properly 
established. 
This Court has previously held that "substantial evidence 
is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). In applying the standard 
of review applicable to this case the Court will look at the "whole 
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record" and will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views. (Id.) There is relevant evidence 
which would reasonably support the conclusion that, given the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Schmidt was subject to exertions 
which were unusual or extraordinary in comparison to typical 
nonemployment activities expected of late twentieth century men and 
women. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decisions of the 
Industrial Commission and its Administrative Law Judge. 
Point IV 
The "Medical Causation" Test Did Not Need To Be Met 
By The Employee, Given The Employer's Waiver 
Of The Defense; However, The Evidence Establishes 
Medical Causation, In Any Event. 
A second element of the Allen test on which proof is 
ordinarily required of a claimant who alleges work-related injury 
when he has a previous history of injury, is in the "medical 
causation" test. To prove medical causation, a claimant must show 
that his injury is "medically the result of an exertion or injury 
that occurred during a work-related activity." Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) . To do this "claimant must 
show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise, that the stress, strain, 
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting 
injury or disability." Id. 
At the time of the Hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge, the medical causation issue was conceded by the employer. 
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It, therefore, was not a subject which was addressed by the 
Administrative Law Judge in his decision. Even if it had not been 
conceded, however, there was sufficient unrebutted evidence to have 
supported the decision that medical causation was proved by Mr. 
Schmidt. 
Excerpts from the Hearing transcript demonstrate that the 
employer waived the "medical causation" issue. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. White, if you 
would like to respond to these four claims and 
raise any defenses. 
MR. WHITE: Well, the defense is raised 
in our Answer, and that is, we do not believe 
that the accident occurred, there not being 
legal causation, as required under the Allen 
case and its progeny. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you are claiming no 
accident? Now, do we have medical evidence to 
establish medical causation? 
MR. WHITE: I think Dr. Rich's report 
does that. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the defense is 
basically legal causation then? 
MR. WHITE: Right. 
(See Hearing transcript, R. 27.) 
Later in the record, the following exchange between the 
Court and counsel for the employer reinforced the previous 
statement: 
THE COURT: It appears that the primary 
issue in this case is one of legal causation. 
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Is that correct? 
MR. WHITE: That's my belief, yes. 
(See Id. at 30.) 
Following further exchange between the Court and counsel 
for both parties, the Court made the following statement: 
Okay. So the major issue here is one of legal 
causation and today we will just receive 
testimony regarding that issue. And, Mr. 
Dewsnup, if you would like to call your 
witness. 
See Id. at 34. 
Based upon the foregoing dialogue and statements, it is 
clear that there was no reason for Mr. Schmidt to present extensive 
evidence on issues of medical causation. The introduction of such 
evidence, in the face of the employer's stated position, would have 
been outside the scope of the issues and would have been a waste of 
time and resources. Mr. Schmidt submits that it would be improper 
to allow an employer to admit that certain elements of a claim were 
not disputed, waive its defenses thereon, and then permit the 
employer to complain that those elements were not proven to the 
requisite degree. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Schmidt need not have 
produced evidence on the "medical causation" issue, the record 
contains ample evidence to have supported a finding that it was 
proven satisfactorily. The letter of Dr. Joseph Charles Rich, 
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which was received without objection, states: 
On the basis of reasonable medical 
probability, the fact that the patient 
apparently had no previous history of right 
leg pain or right sciatica prior to his 
lifting episode of May 1988, it is probable 
that there is a causal [sic] between his 
lifting episode and his right L-4/5 disc 
herniation. 
(See record at 156-157; 332-333.) 
Dr. Rich's letter was received in evidence without 
objection. (R. 23.) No rebutting testimony was offered by the 
employer. (R. 62.) No request was made that a medical panel be 
convened. In compliance with Allen, the claimant showed that his 
actual injury occurred as a result of his exertion while engaged in 
a work-related activity. Dr. Rich's letter squarely addressed that 
issue. The doctor's opinion regarding the effects of travel, when 
coupled with lifting, does not go to the medical causation question 
— at least not directly. His opinion only lends support to the 
background facts and circumstances which are part of the "evidence, 
opinion and otherwise" which help to show that the stage was set 
for injury by the stresses, strains and exertions required by Mr. 
Schmidt's occupation. (See Allen, supra at 27.) 
Point V 
Evidence About Mr. Schmidt's Travel Schedule and 
Travel Fatigue Was Material And Relevant 
To The Occurrence Of His Injury And 
Its Introduction Was No Surprise. 
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The employer argues that the Administrative Law Judge 
improperly admitted evidence of Mr. Schmidt's travel schedule and 
travel fatigue at the time of the Hearing. It claims that such 
evidence was irrelevant, immaterial and surprising. 
The relevance and materiality of Mr. Schmidt's travel 
schedule and travel fatigue are obvious from the Allen decision and 
its progeny. In Allen, after explaining the standards of finding 
legal and medical causation, the Court said that, in order to 
determine whether there was legal causation, it needed more facts, 
such as the number of crates that the claimant had moved, the 
distances they were moved, the weight of the crates, the size of 
the area where moving took place, etc. (Allen, supra at 28.) In 
other words, the Court needed complete background information. 
In Smith & Edwards v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 770 
P. 2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989) , the Court rejected the proposition that 
it decide whether an activity was usual or unusual based on a 
single factor such as the weight of an object lifted. Instead, it 
said that "evidence of the facts and circumstances of the 
employment activity was required." Id. at 1018; see also Sisco 
Hilte v. Industrial Commission of Utahr 766 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 
App* 1988); American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
752 P.2d 1912, 1915 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the present case, the lifting incident which produced 
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injury was simply the culminating event in a hectic week of unusual 
exertion and stress. The background information on Mr. Schmidt's 
travel schedule and fatigue was probative and material to the 
precise question which was to be decided under the Allen legal 
causation test. 
The employer's argument that it was surprised at Mr. 
Schmidt's introduction of evidence about his travel schedule is not 
well taken. Unlike Traylor Brothers, Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. 
Overton, 736 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1987), the attorney for IHC in 
the present case was not misled into thinking that travel was a 
non-issue. On the contrary, the travel issue existed from the 
start: 
1. In Mr. Schmidt's Application for Hearing he 
describes the accident's occurrence with the following opening 
words: "While involved in business travel for my employer . . .." 
(R. 2.) 
2. The employer took Mr. Schmidt's deposition on May 5, 
1989 at which time it had every opportunity to learn of Mr. 
Schmidt's reliance on travel factors. 
3. The employer itself set Mr. Schmidt's travel 
schedule and was well aware of the demands which had been placed 
upon him. 
4. The employer paid Mr. Schmidt's expenses for travel 
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and knew of the time required of him to fly, drive, transport 
baggage, make presentations, complete paper work, set up, take down 
and engage in other activities*. 
5. The employer's defense of "no legal causation" 
implies an awareness of the issues which make up a part of such 
defense, including the background facts and circumstances of an 
employee's work activities. 
6. IHC may not invoke a rule as a defense and then 
claim that it had no notice of the very issues necessary to meet 
the defense which it asserted. 
The employer's citation of Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987), is similarly 
inapposite to the disposition of this case. In Kennecott the issue 
was whether an employer who was put on notice of a claim made for 
injury in 1984 should have to pay for injuries occurring in 1969 
and 1976 about which it had no notice. The Court ruled that notice 
of the claims involving earlier injuries was required. In the 
present case, the question is not whether the employer had notice 
that it might have to pay for previous injuries, but rather whether 
or not notice of an injury is also notice of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding that injury. Mr. Schmidt submits that 
his employer was on notice of his claim and the circumstances which 
produced it. 
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Point VI 
There Is No Indication That The Industrial Commission 
Received Or Considered Evidence In The Form Of A 
Medical Report Which Was Offered After The Decision 
Of The Administrative Law Judge Was Rendered; 
However. Even If It Had, Such An Action Would Have 
Been Harmless Error, If Error At All. 
The last point argued by the employer is that the 
Industrial Commission improperly admitted evidence after .the 
Hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. While it is true that 
a supplemental letter from Dr. Rich was sent to the Industrial 
Commission, there is no indication that the letter was received or 
considered. Furthermore, if the letter had been received and 
considered, such conduct would, at worst, be harmless error, since 
the Commission sustained the Findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge who never saw the letter. 
The Hearing before the Administrative Law Judge in this 
matter, took place on June 9, 1989. (R. 20.) At the time of the 
Hearing, a letter from Dr. Joseph Charles Rich, dated May 18, 1989, 
was received in evidence without objection. (R. 23, 156-157.) The 
Administrative Law Judge's Decision, including Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, was entered on July 10, 1989. The Decision 
refers to information contained in Dr. Rich's letter of May 18, 
1989. (R. 300-307.) On August 8, 1989, the employer moved for 
Industrial Commission Review of the Administrative Law Judge's 
Decision. (R. 310-311.) On September 5, 1989, the claimant's 
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attorney wrote to Dr. Joseph Charles Rich asking him to elaborate 
on certain points of his first letter (R. 359-360.) On September 
8f 1989, Dr. Rich wrote a second letter in reply to the letter of 
claimant's attorney. (R. 356.) On October 2, 1989, the second 
Rich letter was submitted to the industrial Commission and to 
opposing counsel pursuant to §35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
amended, for such consideration as they deemed it appropriate to 
give. (R. 354-361.) On October 6, 1989, attorneys for IHC 
objected to the submission and asked that it be stricken. (R. 362-
364.) The record does not disclose a formal ruling by the 
Industrial Commission on the admissability of the second letter 
from Dr. Rich. However, the Commission makes no reference to the 
letter in its Decision which was entered March 29, 1990. (R. 365-
367.) 
In the Order of the Commission denying employer's Motion 
for Review, it does make reference to the first letter of Dr. Rich. 
However, it makes no reference either directly or indirectly to the 
second letter. Furthermore, such reference as is made is of little 
significance since it was cited in support of a position which the 
Commission asserted only in dicta. 
As has been pointed out in Point II, above, the actual 
holding of the Commission was that the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings and Decision were adopted as the Commission's own. It is 
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undisputed that the Administrative Law Judge did not see or 
consider the second letter of Dr. Rich. If his Findings and 
Decision were adopted, then the second letter had no bearing on the 
Decision. Its submission, if erroneous, was harmless. 
Even if the second letter from Dr. Rich had been 
considered by the Industrial Commission, and the consideration 
thereof had been erroneous, the error would have been harmless, 
since it addressed either (1) issues of causation which were either 
not before the Commission or the Administrative Law Judge due to 
the waiver by the employer, or (2) issues on which there was 
already sufficient evidence to support the Decision by the 
Commission and the Administrative Law Judge. (See Olsen v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937, 940, n.2 Utah App. 
1989.) 
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CONCLUSION 
It is the position of Mr. Schmidt that the Hearing 
process and Industrial Commission review thereof were not governed 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Even if they had been 
so governed, the proceedings were conducted properly. 
The effect of the Order by the Industrial Commission was 
to sustain the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and adopt it as 
the Commission's own. There was no alteration of the findings and 
conclusions of the Judge even though the Commission appears 
inclined to have applied a different standard. 
Evidence of Mr. Schmidt's travel schedule and travel 
fatigue was properly admitted and helped to establish both legal 
and medical causation under the Allen standards. Additional 
evidence from the first letter of Dr. Joseph Charles Rich also 
buttressed Mr. Schmidt's claims as to medical causation which need 
not have been proven given the waiver by counsel for Mr. Schmidt!s 
employer. 
Any effect of a post-Hearing submission of medical 
information was harmless error. 
The policy of the Worker's Compensation scheme is to 
construe the law liberally in favor of coverage for the employee. 
Mr. Schmidt's undisputed injury has been construed by both an 
Administrative Law Judge and the unanimous Industrial Commission to 
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warrant coverage. This Court should affirm those Decisions 
awarding benefits to Mr. Schmidt. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 1990. 
RALPW L. DEWSOTJP 
WILC0X, DEWSNUP & KING 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
LAWRENCE SCHMIDT (EMPLOYEE) 
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ADDENDUM 
Respondent Lawrence Schmidt relies upon Addendum 
materials contained in the brief of Petitioner. 
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